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~Federal Reserve Lending to
Banks That Failed: Implications
for the Bank Insurance Fund1
EBATE THAT LED TO PASSAGE of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act (FDICIA) in 1991 focused on changes
in public policy to reduce losses of the deposit
insurance funds One aspect of public policy
subject to such scrutiny was lending by the Fed-
eral Reserve to troubled banks. A report pre-
pared by congressional staff indicated that over
300 of the banks that failed in 1985-91 were
borrowing from the Fed when they failed, and
that 90 percent of the banks that borrowed for
extended periods of time eventually failed!
Other evidence caused the authors of that con-
gressional staff report to conclude that Fed
credit extended the life of borrowers that ulti-
mately failed. Critics of Fed lending practices
concluded on the basis of this evidence that
lending to troubled banks increased losses to
the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).’ This concern
led to constraints on Federal Reserve lending to
troubled banks in FDICIA (see the shaded insert
on page 4, ‘Restrictions on Federal Reserve
Lending Under FDICIA”).
Restrictions on Federal Reserve lending to
troubled banks raise several issues, including
the proper role of the discount window and the
necessary freedom of action for a central bank
in limiting systemic impacts of problems in the
operation of a banking system. Failures of banks
may have systemic impacts if they cause other
banks to fail or cause disruptions in the pay-
ment system or financial markets. This article
focuses on the more narrow issue of whether
Federal Reserve lending to troubled banks in re-
cent years raised the losses of BIF. Critics of
1The author thanks Kenneth Spong and Walker Todd for
helpful information and insights. The views of the author
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
2See U.S. House of Representatives (1991c).
3See Garsson (1991), Rehm (1991), Starobin (1991) and Todd
(1991, 1992). The FDIC insures the deposits of banks and
savings and loan associations but maintains BIF as a
separate fund for commercial banks and mutual savings
banks. Banks pay insurance premiums into BIF, which then
covers any losses when banks fail.
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Restrictions on Federal Reserve Lending
Under FDICIA
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li-il lending practices have emphasized anecdo- -
tal evidence from a few bank failure cases, - -
particularly the failures of the Bank of New
England and the Madison National Bank.~This
article, in contrast, examines whether the record .-
Prior to passage of Fl)I( IA in 1991, the Feder- of Fed lending to many failed banks supports -
al Reserve had a long-standing policy of not
the arguments of the critics. -. - . -
lending to nonviable institutions, except when
The evidence in this study indicates that loans such lending would facilitate an orderly resolu-
from the Fed to many of the failed banks in tion of institutions. Lending to facilitate orderly
their last year were concentrated near the time resolutions had been undertaken in cooperation
of failure and were allocated to the banks with with the institutions’ supervisors and with the
the greatest liquidity needs. The evidence does deposit insurance authorities. Under this policy,
not support the argument that Federal Reserve the Federal Reserve loaned to some troubled
lending to troubled banks increased the losses banks for extended periods of time. Two of the
of the FDIC. large banks that received Fed credit for extended
4See Schwartz (1992), Todd (1992) and comments by
policymakers in Rehm (1991). For hearings on the failures
of these banks, see U.S. House of Representatives (1991a,
1991 b).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUISperiods of time were the Franklin National Bank,
in 1974, and the Continental Illinois National
Bank, in 1984.~
In response to public criticism that the Feder-
al Reserve had subsidized the Franklin National
Bank, the Fed amended its lending regulations
to establish a new, higher special discount rate
for protracted emergency assistance to particu-
lar banks. Figure 1 indicates that such emergen-
cy assistance—which has been called extended
credit since 1980—at times has been the
predominant form of discount window lending.
Prior to passage of FDICIA late in 1991, there
were no legal constraints on the size or dura-
tion of Federal Reserve lending to troubled
banks.
THE DEBATE OVER LENDING TO
TROUBLED BANKS
The Issues
Public discussion that led to passage of limits
in FDICIAon theauthority of the Federal Reserve
to lend to troubled banks involved two issues.
The first issue, philosophical in nature, involved
the proper purpose for lending. Walker Todd
(1988, 1991, 1992), a major contributor to this
debate, has asserted that the proper role for the
discount window is to lend for short periods of
time to solvent banks that are temporarily illi-
quid. Todd has described Federal Reserve lend-
ing to troubled banks for extended periods of
time as the substitution of credit from the Fed-
eral Reserve for capital of the banks, which he
considered inappropriate use of the discount
window.
The second issue involved the implications of
Federal Reserve lending practices for BIF losses.
This second issue appears to have been more
important to Congress than the philosophical is-
sues raised by Todd, because BIF losses may af-
fect the budget of the federal government. For
that reason, this article focuses on the second
issue in the debate, the implications of Fed lend-
ing practices for BIF.
Critics of Fed lending practices cited two rea-
sons why lending to troubled banks may have
5
increased BIF losses. First, credit from the Fed-
eral Reserve may have given the borrowers ex-
tra time to assume additional risk. Banks may
have increased risk through rapid growth of
their assets, in desperate gambles to regain
financial strength, or through actions to benefit
shareholders, such as paying dividends.
The second argument involved reductions in
borrowers’ uninsured deposits. Deposits often
decline when the public becomes aware of a
bank’s troubles, but deposits in denominations
above the insurance limit of $100,000 per ac-
count tend to fall more rapidly than fully in-
sured deposits. Credit from the Fed may have
allowed the borrowers to remain in operation
while funding relatively rapid declines in their
uninsured deposits. Without credit from the
Fed, these banks may have been unable to fund
deposit withdrawals some time prior to their
failure dates. Chartering agencies might have
closed these banks earlier, when their unin-
sured deposit liabilities were larger, if the Fed
had not made its credit available.
Implications of declines in uninsured deposits
for the losses to BIF in bank failure cases de-
pend on the methods used by the FDIC to
resolve these failures.°The simplest method is
liquidation, in which the failed bank is closed
and the FDIC pays insured depositors in full.
The FDIC over time pays the uninsured deposi-
tors a fraction of their deposits, which depends
on the value of the failed bank’s assets. If the
value of the assets is less than the value of the
liabilities, the FDIC and the uninsured deposi-
tors share as losses the gap between the value
of assets and liabilities. A decline in uninsured
deposits raises the cost to BIF if a case is resolved
through liquidation, since a decline in uninsured
deposits forces the FDIC to absorb more of the
shortfall of the value of assets below liabilities.
In cases resolved through transfer of insured
deposits, banks bid for the deposit accounts of a
failed bank in denominations below the insur-
ance limit. The winning bidder assumes the in-
sured deposit accounts of the failed bank, and
the FDIC makes a cash payment to the winning
bidder equal to the deposits, minus the premi-
5For a view on the history of Federal Reserve discount win-
dow lending, see Schwartz (1992). Thrift institutions have
had access to credit from the discount window since 1980,
under provisions of the Monetary Control Act. This paper
focuses on lending to commercial banks. For convenience
alt depository institutions are called banks.
°Seethe appendix to Gilbert (1992) for an analysis of the
distribution of losses between the FOIC and uninsured
depositors under alternative methods of resolving bank
failure cases.
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um paid by the winning bidder.7 The cost of a
resolution arranged as a transfer of insured
deposits tends to be lower than what the cost
would have been under liquidation by the
amount of the premium, net of administrative
costs of arranging the resolution. The FDIC
shares with the uninsured depositors any losses
from resolving the failed bank. Declines in unin-
sured deposits have the same implications for
BIF losses under liquidation and transfer of in-
sured deposits.
During the years covered by this study,
1983-90, the FDIC resolved most bank failure
cases through a third method called purchase
and assumption (P&JA). In a case resolved through
P&A, the bank with the winning bid assumes all
of the deposit liabilities of the failed bank and
purchases some of its assets. The cash payment
from the FDIC to the winning bidder equals all
deposit liabilities (insured and uninsured), minus
the value of assets purchased by the winning
bidder, minus the premium. The FDIC does not
share any of the losses with uninsured deposi-
tors in cases resolved through P&A, since the
winning bidder assumes all of the deposit liabili-
ties. Even in cases resolved through P&A,
however, declines in uninsured deposits may
increase BIF losses. In some cases, resolution
costs might have been lower if the failed banks
had been closed prior to the declines in unin-
sured deposits and resolved through liquidation
or transfer of insured deposits.
The Evidence
The staff of the House Banking Committee is-
sued a report in 1991 that summarized patterns
in Federal Reserve lending to insured depository
institutions from January 1, 1985, through May
10, 1991. The report concluded:
1. Ninety percent of all institutions that received
extended credit during this period subse-
quently failed.
2. The Federal Reserve routinely extended credit
to institutions with CAMEL ratings of 5 by
their supervisory agencies (the rating that
indicates imminent danger of failure).~
3. Borrowers that failed remained open for
10-12 months on average after being rated
CAMEL 5 by their supervisory agencies. The
report implies that the banks would not have
stayed open that long after being rated CAMEL
S without Federal Reserve credit.
4. Borrowings increased dramatically as the con-
dition of institutions deteriorated.
5. The Federal Reserve took the highest quality
assets as collateral when banks borrowed, in
amounts substantially in excess of the loan
amounts.
6. of the 530 failed institutions that borrowed
from the Federal Reserve in the three-year
period prior to their failure, 320 were bor-
rowing at the time of their failure, with $8.3
billion in discount window credit outstanding.
This paper investigates the implications of these
conclusions for BIF losses.
BORROWINGS BY A SAMPLE OF
FAILED BANKS
This section presents information on Federal
Reserve lending to a sample of banks that failed
from 1985-90. The number of bank failures per
year was relatively large during that period.
Including these years yields a large sample of
failed banks. The sample ends in 1990 to avoid
failures in periods in which Federal Reserve
lending to troubled banks was influenced by the
provisions in FDICIA. Since the content of
FDICIA was discussed and debated throughout
most of 1991, the sample ends with the failures
in 1990. Note in Figure 1 that extended credit
borrowings were relatively low throughout 1991
and have been zero or relatively small since late
1991, when FDICIA was enacted.
The sample is restricted Lo failed banks that
reported their deposits to the Federal Reserve
7Winning bidders in cases resolved through transfer of in-
sured deposits often purchase some of the assets of the
failed banks.
°Whengovernment supervisors examine a bank, they give it
ratings from I (the best) to 5 (the worst) on five aspects of
its operations: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Manage-
ment, Earnings and Liquidity (CAMEL, for short). In addi-
tion, supervisors assign a composite CAMEL rating from I
to 5, based on the ratings for these five components,
Banks with composite ratings of 4 or 5 are classified as
problem banks and subjected to relatively close supervi-
sion. Banks rated composite CAMEL 5 are in such poor
condition that their supervisors consider them to be in
imminent danger of failing.
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Figure 1
Total and Extended Credit Borrowings
each week in their last year, because the analy-
sis involves deposit data in their last year. This
restriction affects the size distribution of the
banks in the sample. Relatively small banks
report their deposit liabilities and vault cash
for one week in a quarter, and their required
reserves are set at the same level for a quarter
based on their reports. The maximum asset size
of the quarterly reporters was changed over the
years 1985-90.
Restricting the sample to those that reported
deposit data to the Fed in each of their last 52
weeks reduces a potential sample of 870 failed
banks to 318. Figure 2 presents the size distri-
bution of the banks in the sample, based on
their total assets as of failure date. Restricting
the sample to banks that reported their deposits
weekly for their last 52 weeks eliminates the
very small banks. None of the banks in the sam-
ple had total assets below $10 million, and only
19 of the 318 banks had total assets below $20
million as of their failure date.
Results derived from this sample of 318 banks
may not apply for smaller banks. In several
ways, however, the observations on borrowings
in the report of the House Banking Committee
are similar to the patterns of borrowings by
banks in this study. Also) among the 870 banks
in the broader sample, ratios of BIF loss to total
assets are not related systematically to asset
size, and the distributions of banks by resolu-
tion methods are similar for the larger and
smaller samples of banks.
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 318
banks in the sample by year of failure and bor-
rowings in their last 52 weeks. Failures of the
banks occurred fairly uniformly over the 1985-
90 period. About 58 percent of these banks bor-
rowed in at least one of their last 52 weeks.
Borrowings tended to be concentrated in the
weeks just prior to failure. Of the 185 banks
that borrowed in their last 52 weeks, 154 (83.2
percent) borrowed in at least one of their last
13 weeks. For the 318 banks as a group, about
54 percent of the total dollar amount of bor-
rowings in their last 52 weeks occurred in their
last 13 weeks. This observation confirms the
conclusion in the report by the staff of the
House Banking Committee that borrowings in-
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Figure 2
Distribution of Banks in the Sample by Total Assets as of Failure Date
Total Assets as of Failure Date
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Conclusions of the staff report of the Rouse
Banking Committee leave the impression that
many failed banks borrowed for long periods
prior to their failure. For instance, the observa-
tion that borrowers remained in operation 10 to
12 months on average as CAMEL-S rated banks
leaves the impression that credit from the dis-
count window was essential for keeping the
borrowers in operation during their last 10 to
12 months. This study indicates, in contrast,
that only a small minority of the banks bor-
rowed for at least half of their last year. Only
28 of the 318 banks (8.8 percent) borrowed in
at least 26 of their last 52 weeks.°The discount
window may have become less accommodating
to troubled banks in 1989-90; only four of the
94 banks that failed in those years borrowed in
half or more of their last 52 weeks.
The sample of failed banks is distributed very
unevenly across Federal Reserve Districts, with
88 percent of the banks located in Districts 6,
10, 11 and 12 (Table 2). These Districts also ac-
count for most of the banks that borrowed in
their last 52 weeks. The banks that borrowed in
half or more of their last 52 weeks were con-
centrated in Districts 10 (Kansas City) and 11
(Dallas), which may reflect differencesin Reserve
Bank lending practices. While the 12 districts
follow the same general policies on lending, the
staff of the district Reserve Banks have some
freedom to follow different lending practices.
Banks in the sample also differ substantially
by the amount of their borrowings relative to
the size of their total deposits. For most of the
banks that borrowed from the Fed in their last
year, average borrowings were small relative to
their average total deposits. Over their last 52
weeks, for instance, 85 percent of the failed
banks either didn’t borrow from the Fed or
their borrowings were less than 1 percent of
9The extreme cases in this sample involved two banks in
the Kansas City District that borrowed almost continuously
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Distribution of Sample Banks by Borrowings from the Federal Reserve in Their
Last Year
Borrowed in Borrowed in at
Number their last Borrowed in least 26 of
of 52 weeks their last their last
Year of failure banks (percent) 13 weeks 52 weeks
1985 50 26(520) 24 4
1986 60 36(600) 78 8
1987 60 43f717j 39 6
1988 54 30 f55.6) 26 6
1989 44 26 ~59 1) 18 2
1990 50 24 (480) 19 2
TOTAL 318 185(582) 154 28
Table 2
Distribution of Sample Banks by Federal Reserve District
Borrowed in Borrowed in Borrowed in at
Number of their last their last least 26 of
Federal Reserve District banks 52 weeks 13 weeks their last 52 weeks
I4 2 1 0
27 3 1 0
30 00 0
43 2 1 0
50 00 0
63 6 2 2 19 2
71 4 6 42
8 2 1 1 0
9 72 2 0
10 66 46 37 10
11 148 85 75 12
12 3,1 16 13 ,2
TOTAL 318 185 154 28
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Table 3
Distribution of Sample Banks by the Size of Their Borrowings Relative to Their
Average Total Deposits
Sum of borrowings divided by the sum of tohal deposits
over the following periods ending on failure dates:
Last 13 weeks Last 26 weeks Last 52 weeks
Range of ratios of No. of Cumulative No. of Cumulative No, of Cumulative
borrowing to total deposits banks percent banks percent banks percent
Zero 164 51.57% 149 46.86% 133 41 82%
0.000 < x 0 001 28 60 38 54 63.84 65 62.26
0.001 < x 0 005 29 69 50 29 72.96 52 78.62
0.005 < x 0.010 23 7673 23 80.19 21 85.22
0010 cx < 0.020 20 8302 22 8711 23 9245
0.020 cx < 0.050 25 90.88 24 94.65 15 9717
0.050-c x 0100 14 9528 10 97.80 6 99.06
0.100 C x 0200 11 9874 5 9937 2 99.69
0200 c x 4 10000 2 10000 1 100.00
borrow in their last year. The mean BIF loss ra-
tios in Table 4 for banks that did and did not
borrow from the Fed in their last year are not
adjusted for differences among the banks, other
than borrowings, that might explain differences
in BIF loss ratios, such as the condition of banks
prior to borrowing or regional effects.
Mean BIF loss ratios are about 5 percentage
points higher among the failed banks that bor-
rowed from the Federal Reserve in their last
year, and differences in the mean loss ratios are
highly significant. The high t-statistics for differ-
ences in mean BIF loss ratios indicate that there
is only a very small chance that the BIF loss ra-
tios of the borrowers and nonborrowers were
drawn from the same distribution.
The association between borrowings and BIF
loss ratios in Table 4 does not necessarily indi-
cate that Fed lending practices caused higher
BIF losses. Perhaps the banks that borrowed
from the Fed in their last year would have had
higher BIF loss ratios than the other banks if
the Fed had not loaned to them. Two observa-
tions raise doubts about the argument that
loans by the Fed caused the higher BIF loss ra-
tios among the borrowers. First, borrowings of
most banks were concentrated near the time of
their failure dates, long after they had assumed
the risk that led to their failure. Second, if Fed-
eral Reserve lending caused the higher BIF loss
ratios among the borrowers, we would expect
the banks that borrowed the most relative to
their deposit size to have the highest BIF loss
ratios. This is not the case. Figures 3 and 4
present information on the association between
BIF loss ratios and ratios of borrowings to
deposits among the banks that borrowed in
their last year. Measuring borrowings over the
last 13 weeks (Figure 3) and the last 52 weeks
(Figure 4), there does not appear to be a posi-
tive association between BIF loss ratios and bor-
rowings ratios.
The remainder of this section attempts to de-
termine whether Fed lending practices caused
the higher BIF loss ratios among the borrowers
by investigating whether evidence supports the
assumptions that underlie such a direction of
causahty.
Did Federal Reserve Credit Help
Keep Problem Banks Open?
Credit from the Fed may have allowed the
borrowers to remain open longer as troubled
banks than the nonborrowers. Supported by
Fed credit, the borrowers may have assumed
additional risk just prior to their failure, result-
ing in larger losses to BIF when they failed. The
report by the staff of the House Banking Com-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS11
Table 4
Association Between BIF Loss Ratio and Borrowings by Failed Banks in Their
Last Year
Mean BIF loss ratio
Group of banks based on borrow- (standard deviation in f-statistic for
ings from the Federal Reserve Number of banks parentheses under mean) difference in means
Borrowings in last 13 weeks’
Yes 154 03067
0 1181)
No 164 0.2514 401
(0 1253)
Borrowings n lash 26 weolcs
Yes 169 03079
(0l228~
No 149 0.2445 4.73
10.11861
Borrowings in last 52 weeks.
Yes 185 0.3007
(0.1253)
Na 133 0.2468 4.02
(0.1175)
‘The BIE loss ratio is the ratio of the loss to BIF from a bank failure divided by total assets of the failed bank as of its
failure date.
mittee emphasized such a link between borrow- failed banks is divided into two groups: those
ings and BIF losses. One of the key conclusions that borrowed from the Federal Reserve in
was that the failed banks which borrowed from their last 13 weeks and those that did not. Bor-
the Federal Reserve in their last three years re- rowings are observed over the last 13 weeks be-
mained open on average about 10 to 12 months cause any banks kept open only through access
after supervisors rated them as CAMEL 5. The to Federal Reserve credit would be borrowing
report implies that these banks would have from the Fed near the time of their failure. Ta-
been closed earlier if the Federal Reserve had ble 5 presents the distributions of these banks
not provided credit. by the length of time they were rated CAMEL 4
- or 5, and rated CAMEL 5, prior to their failure.
There are two problems with such an infer-
-. Banks rated CAMEL 4 or 5 are classified as
ence. First, the report does not indicate when -
problem banks. It is relevant to know whether
in their last three years these banks borrowed - Federal Reserve credit helped banks rated
from the Federal Reserve. Suppose a bank bor- . .- -
-. CAMEL 4 or 5 remain in operation for relatively
rowed for one day three years prior to its failure -- . ,. . - long periods prior to their failure, in addition to
and was rated CAMEL 5 one year prior to - analysis that focuses exclusively on CAMEL
failure. 1 his case would be included among the -
- a-rated banks.
observations supporting the inference that Fed-
eral Reserve credit helped some CAMEL 5 banks . -
- The distributions of banks by the number of
stay open for relatively long periods. -
months they were rated CAMEL 4 or S prior to
A second problem is a lack of comparison to their failure are almost identical for the borrow-
the length of time that nonborrowers were rated ers and nonborrowers. The median number of
CAMEL 5 prior to their failure dates. Table 5 months between the time the banks were rated
provides such a comparison. The sample of 318 problem banks and their failure was 20.5 months
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Figure 3
Relationship Between Borrowings Ratios and BIF Loss
Ratios Among Banks that Borrowed: Last 13 Weeks
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Figure 4
Relationship Between Borrowings Ratios and BIF Loss
Ratios Among Banks that Borrowed: Last 52 Weeks
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Cumulative Distributions of Banks by the Length of Time They Were Problem
Banks Prior to Failure
Borrowed from the Federal Reserve
Intheir last 13 weeks.
No of months rated CAMEL 4
or 5. less than Yes No
No of banks Percent No of banks Percent
1 5 3.2% 6 37%
2 11 71 10 61
5 15 9.7 13 7.9
10 27 17.5 27 16.5
15 47 305 52 31.7
20 72 468 77 470
25 96 62.3 105 640
30 111 721 120 73.2
36 130 84.4 135 82.3
36 or more 154 1000 164 100.0
Median no of months rated CAMEL 4 or 5 20.5 20
No. of months rated CAMEL 5 tessthan
1 15 9.7% 22 13.4%
2 30 195 40 244
5 46 289 63 384
10 77 500 102 62.2
15 111 72.1 130 793
20 135 877 146 890
25 148 961 153 933
30 152 987 158 963
36 153 994 162 96.8
36 or more 154 100.0 164 100.0
Median no, of months ratedCAMEL 5 95 7
for the borrowers and 20 months for the non factor deteiinining how long the borrowers and
borrowers.’° nonborrowei s rated CAMEL 5 remained in
operation. If access to Fed ci edit had been the
I he banks that borrowed in their last 13 only factor, all of the borrowers would have
week tended to be rated CAMEL 5 somewhat been rated CAMEL 5 for relatively long periods
longer than the nonborrowers. The median prior to their failure, and all of the nonborrow-
pei-iod the banks weie rated CAMEL 5 prior to ers rated CAMEL 5 for relatively short periods.
failure was 9.5 months for borrowers, com This was not the case. Periods that both bor
pared to seven months for the nonborrowers rowers and nonborrowers were rated CAMEL 5
ranged from less than one month to three years
Access to credit from the discount window, or more. About 20 percent of the borrowers
howevei, doe not appear to have been the only were closed within two months of the time
10The median is used, instead of the mean, because the few
failed banks that remained open for long periods as
problem banks could distort comparisons of means- For
instance, among the 154 borrowers, three banks were rated
CAMEL 4 or 5 for over 60 months prior to failure’ among
the 164 noriborrowers, four banks were rated CAMEL 4 or
5 for over 60 months.14
when their supervisors rated them CAMEL 5,
whereas many of the nonborrowers remained
in operation rated CAMEL S for much longer
periods.
Suppose Table 5 is interpreted as indicating
that access to credit from the Federal Reserve
allowed borrowers to remain in operation slight-
ly longer as CAMEL 5-rated banks. What would
this imply for losses to BIF? The idea that trou-
bled banks should be closed promptly to keep
them from taking actions that expose BIF to
larger losses is based on the assumption that
supervisors have been ineffective in preventing
troubled banks from taking such actions. This
author, however, has found evidence that super-
visors have been effective in constraining the
behavior of most of the troubled banks under
their jurisdiction.
Some of the evidence reveals the behavior of
banks while their capital ratios were below re-
quired levels or while supervisors rated them as
problem banks. Supervisors attempt to limit as-
set growth, dividends and loans to officers and
directors of the banks (the insiders) of under-
capitalized and problem banks. Gilbert (1991)
reported that large majorities of the banks that
operated in 1955-89 for four or more consecu-
tive quarters with capital ratios below the mini-
mum capital requirement in effect at the time
reduced their assets, refrained from paying divi-
dends and had lower insider loans while under-
capitalized. Gilbert (1992) found that the banks
undercapitalized the longest prior to failure had
the fastest declines in their total assets in their
last year, and the group of banks undercapital-
ized the longest prior to their failure had the
smallest percentage paying dividends in their
last year. Gilbert (1993) found that banks reduced
the growth rates of their assets and reduced
their dividends when supervisors downgraded
them to problem status.
Another study tests directly the association
between the length of time prior to their failure
that banks operated with capital ratios below
the minimum required level and the losses to
the deposit insurance fund resulting from their
failures. Gilbert (1992) found no association be-
tween losses to the deposit insurance fund and
the length of time banks were undercapitalized
prior to their failure. Thus, if Federal Reserve
lending practices allowed some CAMEL 5-rated
banks to remain in operation slightly longer
than others, it is not clear that those lending
practices had any effect on BIF losses.
Behavior of the Banks That
Borrowed
Conclusions about the behavior of most trou-
bled banks may not apply to those that bor-
rowed from the Fed near the time of their
failure. Since these banks were privileged to
have access to credit from the discount window
near the time of their failure, they may have
had other privileges not available to all troubled
banks.
The articles cited above indicate that troubled
banks subject to relatively close supervision
tended to reduce their assets and refrain from
paying dividends. Table 6 examines the deposit
growth and dividends of borrowers and nonbor-
rowers that were rated CAMEL 4 or S one year
prior to their failure. Of these 238 banks, 96
did not borrow from the Fed in their last year,
and the remaining 142 banks borrowed at least
once in their last year. The 142 borrowers are
divided into several groups, based on their aver-
age borrowings over their last year as a percen-
tage of average total deposits over their last
year. For each of the groups in Table 6, based
on their borrowings ratios, the mean of the per-
centage change in total deposits in their last
year was negative. The borrowers tended to
have more rapid declines in total deposits in
their last year than the nonborrowers, and
those that borrowed more relative to the size of
their total deposits tended to have faster rates
of decline in total deposits than the banks with
lower borrowings ratios. These observations are
consistent with the view that the banks that
borrowed most relative to their deposits had
the greatest liquidity needs.
About 15.5 percent of the banks rated CAMEL
4 or 5 in their last year paid dividends in their
last year, and this percentage was about the
same for the borrowers and nonborrowers.
Dividends as a percentage of total assets, how-
ever, were smaller among the borrowers that
paid dividends in their last year (mean of 0.29
percent) than among the nonborrowers that
paid dividends in their last year (mean of 0.45
percentL Based on deposit growth and divi-
dends, supervision of the problem banks that
borrowed in their last year appears to have
been at least as strict as the supervision of
problem banks that did not borrow from the
Fed.
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Table 6
Deposit Growth and Dividends of Banks Rated CAMEL 4 or 5 Over Their
Last Year
Of banks that paid
dividends, mean of
Mean of percentage dividends as percent-
Range of ratios of borrowings change in total No. of banks that age of average total
to total deposits over the last No. of deposits over last paid dividends in assets over the
52 weeks banks 52 weeks their last year last year
Zo’o 96 —121°/n IS 045%
Ocx <0001 53 —131 5 012
0001< x s0.005 35 —172 8 041
0005 < x < 0010 16 —202 3 022
0010< x c0020 17 -195 3 027
0070 < x 0050 13 —27.3 0 N/A
0050 C x 0.100 5 —299 3 035
0100 < x < 0200 2 —19.2 0 N/A
0.200 c x 1 58.3 0 N/A
TOTAL 238 37
Did Borrowers Rave Larger
Declines in Uninsured Deposits?
One of the arguments that Fed lending prac-
tices raised BIF losses rests on the assumption
that uninsured deposits declined more rapidly
at borrowing banks than at nonborrowing
banks, Table 7 indicates that for the banks that
borrowed in their last year, the mean of the
percentage change in large denomination time
deposits over their last 52 weeks (negative 34.3
percent) was significantly different from the
mean percentage change in other deposits
(negative 9.6 percent). Large denomination time
deposits of the banks that borrowed from the
Fed in their last 26 weeks also declined more
rapidly on average than their other deposits
over their last 26 weeks (negative 26.2 percent
compared to negative 8.6 percent).
This pattern of more rapid declines in large
denomination time deposits than in other
deposits at boi-rowing banks, however, is almost
identical to the record fot- the banks that did
not borrow from the Federal Reserve in their
last year.’2 Credit from the Federal Reserve
does not appear to have facilitated more rapid
declines in large denomination time deposits at
the banks that borrowed from the Fed. These
observations fail to support one of the argu-
ments linking access to credit from the discount
window and BIF losses: that declines in unin-
sured deposits near the time of failure were
more rapid for borrowers than nonborrowers.
.vederat .Beserve Lending to
Troubled Banks .Mav .t.tnvc .Livnited
RIP .Losses bit Proinotuig Orderly
Resoiu.tkns
Resolution of a failed bank through methods
other than liquidation takes some time for the
FDJC to arrange. The FUIC has to prepare a
package of assets and liabilities for bidders to
‘1lnstructions for reporting deposits call for classifying
brokered deposits in denominations of $100,000 or less as
small denomination time deposits.
12The t-statistics for differences between the mean growth
rates of large denomination deposits at the borrowers and
nonborrowers, measured over their last 26 weeks and over
their last 52 weeks, are less than 0.2.
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Deposit Growth of Failed Banks in the Last Year: Borrowers and Non-
borrowers
Banks that borrowed from the Banks that did not borrow from
Fed in their last 52 weeks the Fed in their East 52 weeks
Mean percentage change in total deposits in
their last
26 weeks
(t-stat,stic for difference in growth rates for
borrowers and nonborrowers) — 13.0 Va f —2.38) — 10.3 °,o
52 weeks
(t-statist’c for difference in growth rates for
borrowers and nonborrowersl — 17.3 1 —2.79) -- 11 7
Mean percentage change in large time deposits
in the last 26 weeks —26.2 —256
Mean percentage change In deposits other than
large time deposits in the last 26 weeks — 8.6 — 70
l-slalistics for difference in means of growth
rates of large lime deposits and other deposits - 901 — 5.63
Mean percentage change in large time deposits
in the last 52 weeks - 34.3 —33.5
Mean percentage change in deposits
other than large time depostis in the last
52 weeks - 96 — 6.0
t-statistics for difference in means of growth
rates of large time deposits and other deposits - 683 — 5.51
c’’arnint’. aIlt,~~ llit’ru tinit- ti z’s~t’s~us ~ak’i’ nt’nr- the time uI thi’ii- fuilui-e. ‘I able S indicates
and ar-r-angc’ Icu- tran-~li’rut he a~,t’tsand liabil— that (In’ pc’rct’ntagi’s ut hatiLS i’t’~øl~ ctl In each
lies lii tlit’ ~iriimit~lnclcIc’i. I’ti’,tiliiti,iii.s aIiZIii,t4i’(l (II thu tliet’e IflttbIodS %~ Pit’ ,ih@t.il thu s.tnie tin’
Zi,, tiLc..\ tenth to he less e~jieu~i~ e to the I-I)R’ the liank¼hat hoi-ron’ed in theft hasl 13 n eeLs
tFi:ici othici t\ ~)t’~ ut I_t%~,OltItiOii~._i‘ t.t’iithiiig Ii’,’ auth those thai diii not ‘ lhc’si ob’,t’i ‘~ations do
lit’ I ccitt-al Reser~ t’ nun have aIlo~~ ed “-otiie cud ~UliliiirI liii’ argLlmt’nl I hat t-’c-tier’ah Resi’i-~ e
hank’. to n’in.iiii opt’it n bile he II )R n ni-Led lii lu’iiditu~ teal’ lit timt’ nI adore laeihitaled -c-so—
iuuiuniuiizc’ r-c’’,cjlctliuiiu t-c,’-,ts lcititiiis ltitiictglu utit’tluciuls t,thiii’ tI1~nihicittiti1ilittui.
Uuu’ mi-ru il t’~iclt’rit-c’thai I echetal Hi-sene l.iqntd.tlions cii taiheal banks rnichrt hia~t’men
leuiditig lacilitated oi’tiei h~rt’snitjtions fl notch bc mole c’orumtorr n itbout I t’der’al Re’,er\ p c-iedit to
a luu~~ ii- ~ut’nrrrligc’ uI lirILildallons among hut li’tutilihi’d Iwiuks. stole ht)ITO%~ el’s tad
h~iuik5that borioni’ti 10111 hi’ I i’dPiah Iie’.t’i-~i’ rapid tii’PIi it’.’, iii tltt’ii touth deposits in thuc’h’ ha’.l
“See Gibert (1992)
‘‘Results are similar to ihuse ir rable S it the div’sinn be
tween tne two g’oups of banks is based on bo’~ow’ngs in
the 2b weeks ending ‘n to lure17
Table 8
Distribution of Banks by Borrowings Near the Time of Their Failure and by
Resolution Method
Borrowed from the Federal Reserve
in their last 13 weeks:
Yes No
Resolution method Number Percent Number Percent
Purchase and assumption 122 79.2% 129 78.7%
rransfer of insured deposits 23 149 24 146
Liquidation 9 58 11 _6 7
TOTAL 154 100.0 164 100.0
year than nonborrowers (Table 7). Without
credit from the Federal Reserve, rapid deposit
declines might have forced the FDIC to liquidate
more banks. This argument, however, does not
provide a strong defense for Federal Reserve
lending to troubled banks, since the FDIC has
authority to use its resources to keep troubled
banks open until it can determine the least cost-
ly method of resolution. Options available to the
FDIC include lending to troubled banks, inject-
ing capital through open bank assistance, and
operating failed banks as bridge banks while
they search for buyers, as in the case of the
Bank of New England.
CONCLUSIONS
About 60 percent of the sample of banks that
failed in 1985-90 borrowed from the Federal
Reserve in their last 5Z weeks. In addition, loss-
es of the Bank Insurance Fund were larger
among the banks that borrowed from the Fed-
eral Reserve in their last year. The combination
of these observations could be interpreted as
evidence that the Federal Reserve engaged in a
major operation of sustaining the life of trou-
bled bamjks that eventually failed, and that the
Federal Reserve increased BIF losses substantial-
ly by lending to many banks near the time of
their failure.
This evidence, however, does not necessarily
prove that Fed lending practices caused the
higher BIF loss ratios of the borrowers. Perhaps
the Fed made loans to banks which would have
had relatively high BIF loss ratios with or without
Fed loans. This article investigates whether evi-
dence supports the arguments that Fed lending
caused larger BIF losses.
One argument is that Fed credit extended the
life of the borrowers, giving troubled banks
with little to lose additional time to assume risk.
Borrowers were rated CAMEL S by government
supervisors (in imminent danger of failing)
slightly longer prior to their failure than the
nonborrowers. Additional evidence, however,
indicates that the borrowers tended to have
faster declines in total deposits and tended to
pay smaller dividends than the nonborrowers in
their last year. These observations on deposit
growth and dividends are consistent with the
view that the banks which borrowed from the
Fed in their last year were under strict supervi-
sion appropriate for troubled banks.
The evidence does not support the argument
that borrowers had relatively rapid declines in
their uninsured deposits near the time of their
failure, which would have raised the cost of
resolution through methods other than pur-
chase and assumption. Large denomination time
deposits declined at about the same rates on
average for borrowers and nonborrowers over
their last 26-to-52 weeks.
It is possible to make an argument that, in
many cases, Federal Reserve lending to failed
banks helped limit BIF losses. Jn most cases,
borrowings were concentrated in a few weeks
just prior to failure. These loans may have al-
lowed the banks to remain in operation, fund-
ing deposit withdrawals, while the FDIC worked
to arrange resolutions less costly to BIF than
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1994is
liquidations. Evidence on resolution methods in
the bank failure cases, however, does not sup-
port this interpretation. Percentages of failed
bank cases resolved through purchase and as-
sumption, transfer of insured deposits to other
banks and liquidation were about the same for
borrowers and other failed banks.
Overall, the evidence does not support the ar-
gument that Federal Reserve lending to failed
banks affected the costs of bank failures to BIF.
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